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Surrogacy Contracts in the 1990's: The
Controversy and Debate Continues
In this modem age of medical advancements, infertile cou-
ples' are presented with a variety of solutions which can give
them the child of their dreams.' Specifically, the option of hav-
ing a surrogate' impregnated with their genetic material often
appears as an attractive alternative for infertile couples who
wish to have a child that is genetically linked to themselves.
With the publicity of the Baby M case,4 surrogacy contracts
have become a dominant topic of talk shows, newspaper articles
and magazine stories as well as producing debate and controver-
sy among many different societal groups.5 Surrogacy contracts
1. Infertility is most commonly defined as an inability to conceive after 12
months of unprotected intercourse. See Karen A. Bussel, Note, Adventures in
Babysitting: Gestational Surrogate Mother Tort Liability, 41 DUKE L.J. 661, 662 n.3
(1991).
2. For many couples, recent developments such as artificial insemination and
in vitro fertilization, have provided solutions to infertility. Artificial insemination was
the first method developed to procure conception without sexual intercourse. CARMEL
SHALEV, BIRTH POWER: THE CASE FOR SURROGACY 58 (1989). This procedure involves
simply the injection of sperm into the vagina of a woman. Id. In vitro fertilization,
more commonly known by the term test-tube baby, is more complicated and involves
removing eggs from the woman's ovaries by a surgical procedure. Id. at 110-11. The
eggs are then fertilized outside the woman's body. Id. If the procedure is successful,
then the resulting embryo will be placed in the woman's uterus. Id. at 105.
Other recent medical developments include drug therapy, microsurgery and
laser surgery. Bussel, cited at note 1, at 662 n.3.
3. The Model Surrogacy Act proposed by the American Bar Association de-
fines a surrogate as "[tihe gestational carrier of any embryo, a fetus, or a child."
A.B., Model Surrogacy Act, in SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD 270, 271 (Larry Gostin
ed., 1990).
4. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988). The In re Baby M case was the
first nationally publicized case to bring to light the problems which arise from surro-
gacy contracts. The issue in In re Baby M was whether a surrogacy contract was
enforceable under New Jersey law when the contract between the natural father and
the surrogate mother required the surrogate to relinquish all parental rights after
the child's birth. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1234. See notes 63-74 and accompany-
ing text for further discussion of In re Baby M.
5. While the debate over surrogacy contracts in the media may be a recent
development, the actual concept of surrogate motherhood is not. The book of Genesis
tells the story of Abraham's wife, Sarah, who could not conceive a child and conse-
quently, arranged with her handmaiden to bear her husband's son, Ishmael. Rene
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raise concerns which vary from ethical and moral considerations
to concerns that surrogacy arrangements are unconstitutional.
Surrogacy arrangements usually emerge as a result of one of
two situations. First, when a married woman cannot carry a
fetus to term for medical reasons, but is able to produce healthy
eggs, a couple may choose to have a child through a surrogate.
In such a situation, the woman's egg can be fertilized with her
husband's sperm outside the womb and implanted into a surro-
gate.' This arrangement is referred to as a gestational surroga-
cy.' Second, surrogacy arrangements arise when a married
woman is infertile and incapable of producing a healthy egg. In
this situation, the husband's sperm will be used to fertilize an
egg of the surrogate and the surrogate will then carry the fetus
to term.' This arrangement is referred to as a traditional surro-
gacy.9
An infertile couple, who wishes to enter into a surrogacy con-
tract, need only find a willing female with no past family history
of illness or disease, who has a healthy womb and perhaps also
a fertile egg if the childless woman is unable to donate an
egg.' o The surrogate will have -to obligate at least nine months
of her life to carrying the fetus to term. However, she need not
necessarily stop working or participating in her regular daily
activities. All of the surrogate's medical expenses will be paid
and she will most probably receive a bonus of approximately
$10,000 for her time." After nine months, a child is born and
Lynch, Supreme Court Ends Orange County Surrogacy Fight, LOS ANGELES TIMES,
October 5, 1993, at Al.
6. The reproductive technology employed in such a situation is in vitro fertil-
ization. Katherine B. Lieber, Selling the Womb: Can the Feminist Critique of Sur-
rogacy be Answered?, 68 IND. L.J. 205, 207 (1992). See SHALEV, cited at note 2, at
110-11 for detailed discussion of in vitro fertilization.
7. Moschetta v. Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893, 894 (Cal. 4th App. Dist.
1994). Gestational surrogacy creates a child that is genetically linked to both mem-
bers of the married couple. See Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 894.
8. Usually, artificial insemination is used to fertilize the surrogate's egg.
Lieber, cited at note 6, at 206-07. See also SHALEV, cited at note 2, at 58-60 (de-
scribing the artificial insemination procedure).
9. Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 894. In a traditional surrogacy, the surro-
gate is the natural mother and the contracting male is the natural father. Id. The
childless couple will most likely view the surrogate as an egg donor who happens to
also carry the resulting embryo to term. SHALEV, cited at note 2, at 86.
10. Brokerage agencies that arrange for the meeting of a potential surrogate
and a childless couple are not uncommon. These brokerage agencies charge a fee for
the services they provide. R. Alta Charo, Legislative Approaches to Surrogate Mother-
hood, in SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD 88, 92 (Larry Gostin ed., 1990).
11. The most common fee for a surrogate mother is $10,000 in addition to
other expenses such as medical bills, life insurance, maternity clothes and transpor-
tation. See U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Infertility: Medical and
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the married couple takes home the child of their dreams.
Consider, however, the situation where the surrogate changes
her mind after being impregnated. She feels she can no longer
go through with the surrogacy arrangement because she has
developed a bond with the child. The childless couple's dream of
having a child of their own now turns into a legal nightmare,
which will begin before the child is born and last anywhere from
the first few months to the first few years of the child's life.
Issues of fundamental importance in the area of parental
rights and reproductive freedoms are raised when a surrogate
decides to keep the child she is carrying. Therefore, the contro-
versy over surrogacy contracts has produced a wide spectrum of
arguments against such arrangements. The first part of this
comment addresses the main social and legal arguments against
surrogacy contracts. These arguments primarily center on the
potential harm that surrogacy contracts cause to women, chil-
dren and our society. The second part of this comment discusses
the judicial response to issues raised by surrogacy contracts.
Specifically, the comment analyzes the reasoning behind various
state court opinions addressing surrogacy issues. In the third
part of the comment, the apparent need for legislative guidance
is discussed, along with the various state statutes which have
been enacted in an effort to avoid conflicts which arise from
surrogacy contracts. Finally, a hypothetical "ideal" surrogacy
statute is proposed and evaluated.
LEGAL AND SOCIAL ARGUMENTS AGAINST
SURROGACY CONTRACTS
Surrogacy contracts raise issues concerning reproductive free-
doms, parental rights to raise a child and rights to maintain the
integrity of the family unit. For instance, proponents of surroga-
cy arrangements claim that a married couple has the right to
contract with a willing third party in order to obtain a child who
is genetically related to themselves. 2 On the other hand, oppo-
nents of such arrangements claim that a surrogate's rights of
reproductive freedom and autonomy necessitates that she cannot
be compelled, even by a contractual arrangement, to either give
birth to a child or alternatively, to relinquish her parental right
Social Choices, OTA-BA-358 (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1988).
12. Larry Gostin, A Civil Liberties Analysis of Surrogacy Arrangements, in
SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD 3 (Larry Gostin ed., 1990).
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to a child after she has given birth." Therefore, both the argu-
ments of proponents and opponents of surrogacy arrangements
involve claims that the rights of either the intended parents or
the surrogate will be violated. Although the arguments forward-
ed by surrogacy proponents are numerous, the arguments
against surrogacy arrangements are the focus of this comment.
The Money Component
Many opponents of surrogacy arrangements argue that such
arrangements constitute baby selling contracts" and that such
contracts turn the child into no more than a commodity, which
can be bought and sold like most other consumer products."
The fear surrounding this argument is that babies, like pedi-
greed dogs and fresh produce, will become commercial products
that can be bought and sold at market prices." Concerns over
the money component of surrogacy contracts center on the po-
tential harm that money transactions will cause to the child or
children involved.
17
13. Gostin, cited at note 12, at 3.
14. The New Jersey Supreme Court adopted this argument, in In re Baby M,
when the court concluded that surrogacy contracts were comparable to baby selling
arrangements. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1240. As such, the court held that a tra-
ditional surrogacy arrangement involving money was unenforceable. Id. at 1248. The
court explained that:
This is the sale of a child, or, at the very least, the sale of a mother's right
to her child, the only mitigating factor being that one of the purchasers is the
father. Almost every evil that prompted the prohibition of payment of money
in connection with adoptions exists here.
Id.
15. Katherine Lieber, in her discussion of feminist approaches to surrogacy
contracts, wrote that some feminists "contend that surrogacy should be prohibited for
the same reasons that the sale of organs for transplantation is prohibited." Lieber,
cited at note 6, at 212-13 (citing Shari O'Brien, Commercial Conception: A Breeding
Ground for Surrogacy, 65 N.C. L. REV. 127, 143 (1986)). The arguments against the
sale of organs parallel the arguments against surrogate contracts for money. Lieber,
cited at note 6, at 212-13 (citing O'Brien, at 142-43). First, in both situations the
seller is likely to suffer both physical and emotional pain. Lieber, cited at note 6, at
212-13. The buyer is likely to be charged extortionate fees. Id. Finally, the commodi-
ty itself, is something that is unique and irreplaceable. Id.
16. O'Brien, cited at note 15, at 144. Shari O'Brien, commenting on the poten-
tial harmful commercial aspect of surrogacy contracts, stated that "babies, like auto-
mobiles, stocks, and pedigreed dogs, will be viewed quantitatively, as merchandise
that can be acquired, at market or discount rates." Id.
17. Lori B. Andrews, Surrogate Motherhood The Challenge for Feminists, in
SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD 167, 176 (Larry Gostin ed., 1990). With surrogacy being
considered essentially baby selling, arguments are raised that if surrogacy arrange-
ments for money are allowed then the security children feel within their family life
will be disturbed in that they may "worry that they will be sold and wrenched from
their existing family." Id.
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Nevertheless, the question of whether a child is harmed by a
surrogacy contract involving compensation remains unsettled
with authorities split on the issue. Even opponents of surrogacy
contracts are faced with admitting that there is no evidence or
research to establish that children born of surrogacy arrange-
ments are faced with any different problems than other chil-
dren.' One viewpoint asserted is that "[slurrogacy is distin-
guishable from baby selling since the resulting child is never in
a state of insecurity" and "[tihere is thus no psychological stress
to that child or to any other existing child that he or she may
someday be sold."' 9
However, an opposing viewpoint suggests that children born
of surrogacy contracts will be "genetically confused or bewildered
by the separation of genetic, gestational, and social parent-
age." ' From a somewhat different perspective, some surrogacy
opponents argue that when a surrogate mother receives compen-
sation for handing over a child that she has carried for nine
months her children will fear that they too may be sold.2' Al-
though the emotional effects on a child are for the most part
theoretical, this does not diminish the fact that baby selling is
generally viewed as immoral and unethical. '
Those who argue that surrogacy is no more than baby selling
rely on both the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution' and state adoption statutes24 as authority for
the proposition that the payment of money for a child is illegal
18. Gostin, cited at note 12, at 7. Larry Gostin writes that there is "no data
to demonstrate that children born as the result of surrogacy contracts are worse off
by any measure-that they suffer more neglect, abandonment, and physical abuse, or
that they receive less nurturing and love." Id.
19. Andrews, cited at note 17, at 176.
20. John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the State's Burden of Proof in
Regulating Noncoital Reproduction, in SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD 24, 28 (Larry Gostin
ed., 1990). John Robertson, in this article on the need to regulate noncoital repro-
ductive techniques, contends that surrogacy, along with gamete donation, are two
reproductive technologies that tend to produce children that are confused about there
parentage. Id.
21. Lieber, cited at note 6, at 217.
22. In In re Baby M, the New Jersey Supreme Court found that the "evils in-
herent in baby-bartering are loathsome for a myriad of reasons." In re Baby M, 537
A.2d at 1241. Essentially, the court reasoned that baby selling could result in the
exploitation of the parties involved without regard to the mother's or the child's best
interests. Id. at 1242. It is fear that women and children will be exploited, if babies
are allowed to be sold, that has led society to view the practice of baby selling as
immoral and unethical.
23. Gostin, cited at note 12, at 9; Angela R. Holder, Surrogate Motherhood
and the Best Interest of Children, in SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD 77, 82 (Larry Gostin
ed., 1990).
24. Gostin, cited at note 12, at 9; Holder, cited at note 23, at 82.
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and immoral. Surrogacy opponents interpret the Thirteenth
Amendment," which prohibits involuntary servitude, as prohib-
iting monetarily induced surrogacy contracts."6 It has been sug-
gested by at least one writer, that there is no distinction to be
made between the selling and disposing of a slave and the sell-
ing and disposing of a child.27 Although the Thirteenth Amend-
ment argument is frequently raised in the surrogacy debate, the
courts have generally not relied on this argument in deciding
the validity of surrogacy contracts.28
A similar yet distinct argument against surrogacy contracts
for money centers on the contention that money payments for a
child, even in a surrogacy situation, are violative of many state
adoption statutes. Surrogacy opponents question how a surro-
gate can be paid to bear a child for a married couple when the.
payment of money in an adoption situation is considered a crimi-
nal offense.29 Many surrogacy opponents see little practical dif-
ference between a traditional surrogacy situation and an adop-
tion situation,0 because in a surrogacy arrangement in all
25. The Thirteenth Amendment provides that, "Inleither slavery nor involun-
tary servitude, except as punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been
duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their
jurisdiction." U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
26. Gostin, cited at note 12, at 9.
27. Holder, cited at note 23, at 82. Holder refers to the Civil Code of Louisi-
ana which defined a slave as "a person whose master 'may sell and dispose of his
person.' " Id. (citing LA. CIV. CODE art. 35 (1870)).
28. The California Supreme Court in addressing the surrogacy issues in John-
son v. Calvert acknowledged that the Thirteenth Amendment has been the basis of
prohibiting criminal punishment for the refusal to work. Johnson v. Calvert, 851
P.2d 776, 784 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 206 (1993) (citing Pollack
v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 18 (1944)). However, the California court dismissed the
application of the Thirteenth Amendment to surrogacy contracts because the court
did not view the surrogacy arrangement as producing a situation of involuntary
servitude. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 784. The court wrote "[wle see no potential for that
evil [which arises from involuntary servitude] in the contract at issue here, and
extrinsic evidence of coercion or duress is utterly lacking." Id.
The New Jersey court in In re Baby M did acknowledge that the Thirteenth
Amendment could be a plausible argument against surrogacy, but the court declined
to specifically rely on it. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1253. The court noted in a
footnote that "[olpponents of surrogacy have put forth arguments based on the thir-
teenth amendment . . . . wle need not address these arguments because we have
already held the contract unenforceable on the basis of state law." Id. at 1253 n.12.
29. Larry Gostin, in his article concerning civil liberties involved in surrogacy
contracts, notes that there are many state statutes that make it a criminal offense
to pay to adopt a child. Gostin, cited at note 12, at 9. Further, Gostin asserts that
surrogacy contracts are in many respects similar to paid adoptions. id. Therefore, it
is not difficult to see how state adoption statute could be applicable in surrogacy
situations. Id.
30. Id. Gostin writes that, "[iln both cases the payment is for delivery of a
baby: there is no substantive difference between paying a women to gestate a child
and then to deliver it, and paying a woman to deliver an already 'produced' child."
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practicality the resulting child will be adopted by the wife of the
natural father."' Therefore, if surrogacy is to be viewed as sim-
ply an adoption situation, then adoption statutes would very
well be applicable.
Courts have been more willing to adopt the argument that
surrogacy contracts involving compensation contradict state
adoption laws than they have been to assert that the contracts
are in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment. In the In re Baby
M case, the New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that a tradi-
tional surrogacy contract was unenforceable partially on the
basis that the surrogacy arrangement could not be distinguished
from an adoption arrangement. 2 The New Jersey Supreme
Court explained that a surrogacy arrangement, where both par-
ties know that money was being paid for a child, cannot be dif-
ferentiated from a situation where money was paid to adopt a
child.' Therefore, the court found that the payment of money
in a surrogacy arrangement was contrary to New Jersey public
policy, because New Jersey law prohibited the payment of mon-
ey to adopt a child.3 Thus, the argument that surrogacy con-
tracts should be unenforceable when they involve the exchange
of money is an argument for which a compelling statutory basis
Id. See also Holder, cited at note 23, at 77.
31. Holder, cited at note 23, at 77. Angela Holder writes that, "[a]doption law,
of course, is directly relevant to surrogacy agreements, since in each case the
father's wife will presumably seek to adopt the surrogate's child." Id.
32. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1240-42.
33. Id. at 1240-41. The court dismissed the argument that the money was
being paid for the surrogate to provide a service to the married couple. Id. at 1241.
Specifically, the court wrote:
As for the contention that the [married couple is] paying for services and not
for an adoption, we need note only that they would pay nothing in the event
the child died before the fourth month of pregnancy, and only $1,000 if the
child were stillborn, even though the "services" had been fully rendered.
Id.
34. Id. at 1246. Other courts have also determined that surrogacy contracts,
which involve money, conflict with state adoption statutes. See Doe v. Kelly, 307
N.W.2d 438 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1183 (1983). Doe was one
of the earliest cases to address the issue of whether compensation can be paid in a
surrogacy arrangement. See Doe, 307 N.W.2d at 439. In Doe, the Court of Appeals of
Michigan held that the right to privacy and the right to procreative freedom could
allow a childless couple to contract with a surrogate, but that the state could still
regulate such contracts by prohibiting the payment of money in such an arrange-
ment. Id. at 441; see also In re Paul, 550 N.Y.S.2d 815, 818 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1990).
The purpose behind most adoption statutes, which prohibit the use of money in an
adoption, is the concern that the sale of a child will result in the exploitation of all
parties involved. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1242.
The Kentucky Supreme Court was one of the only state courts to find that
commercial surrogacy did not violate state laws prohibiting baby selling. See Surro-
gate Parenting Associates, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 704 S.W.2d 209, 211 (Ky. 1986).
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can be found.
Waiver of Parental Rights and Reproductive Freedoms
Another argument against surrogacy contracts is that such
arrangements are harmful to a woman's parental rights and
reproductive freedoms. It is argued that a surrogate mother
cannot, by simply signing a contract, waive her right to make
her own decision as to whether to parent a child or whether to
choose to have an abortion." Further, it has been suggested
that a woman's right to make future decisions related to her
body and her lifestyle is of such fundamental importance that
such rights should not be overridden by a surrogacy contract."'
Indeed, a woman's right to reproductive freedom has been
firmly established by the United States Supreme Court. 7 The
Court's decisions have recognized a woman's right to use contra-
ceptives to avoid pregnancy 8 and a woman's right to terminate
a pregnancy through abortion."9 The Supreme Court's rationale
has been that reproductive rights are fundamental and protected
by a gleaned constitutional right to privacy.40
Further, the Supreme Court has acknowledged a woman's
right to control her body and lifestyle without interference. Even
in situations where the husband of a woman wishes to intervene
in the woman's decision to seek an abortion, the Supreme Court
has held that a husband could not compel his wife to carry a fe-
tus to term against her will.4 The Supreme Court has also
found a Massachusetts statute that required a pregnant minor
to have her parent's permission before seeking an abortion un-
constitutional." Therefore, a woman's right to make her own
35. Gostin, cited at note 12, at 13.
36. Id. at 14.
37. See. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154-56 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
38. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86.
39. Roe, 410 U.S. at 154-56. In Roe, the Supreme Court concluded that the
right to privacy encompassed the right of a woman to choose to have an abortion.
Id. at 154.
40. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 152. The Supreme Court has established that "a
right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does
exist under the Constitution." Id. Furthermore, the Roe decision recognized that the
right to privacy extended to activities related to the marital relationship. Id.
41. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 71 (1976).
42. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 647 (1979). In this case, the Supreme
Court found that a minor female had to be given the opportunity to go directly to
the courts without first seeking her parent's permission to have an abortion. Bellotti,
443 U.S. at 647. Before the courts would allow the minor to have an abortion with-
out her parent's consent, the court had to determine that the minor was "mature
910 Vol. 33:903
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health decisions has been highly guarded by the Supreme Court.
Although a woman's right of reproductive freedom is protected
by the Constitution, there still remains a question of whether
her rights can be waived by a surrogacy contract. Generally, if a
right is recognized as constitutionally protected, then there is a
presumption that such a right cannot be waived absent evidence
of voluntariness and knowledge.' Surrogacy contracts are, the-
oretically, entered into freely." However, surrogacy opponents
argue that it is not reasonable to assume that a woman can give
an advanced waiver of her right to make choices involving her
body and lifestyle. 5
Not surprisingly, advanced waivers of constitutional rights
have been construed very strictly by courts." Surrogacy oppo-
nents take the position that when a surrogate signs a contract,
before she has even been impregnated, she cannot waive her
right to parent a child or to terminate a pregnancy.'7 It is ar-
gued that a woman's parental rights have not even been created
when the contract is entered into." Those rights are created
only at the birth of the child and therefore, a contract waiving
the surrogate's rights prior to the surrogate being impregnated
and well enough informed to make intelligently the abortion decision." Id.
43. Gostin, cited at note 12,. at 13 (citing Brady v. U.S., 397 U.S. 742, 748
(1970)). Gostin's article suggests there is a "voluntariness and knowledge" standard
that is applied by the courts to determine if an individual has freely waived a con-
stitutionally protected right. Gostin, cited at note 12, at 13. There are, of course,
situations where individuals cannot waive their constitutional rights under any cir-
cumstances. Id. Gostin, citing an example of a situation where constitutional rights
cannot be waived, states, "criminal defendants cannot irrevocably waive the right to
be present at trial in a capital case, to raise a plea of incompetence to stand trial,
or to assert a privilege against self-incrimination." Id. at 14.
44. Surrogate mothers decide for themselves whether to bear a child for a
married couple. However, some feminist scholars argue that surrogacy contracts are
a "form of slavery or prostitution in which the surrogate is exploited through the
enticements of money, the social expectation of self-sacrifice, or both." Lieber, cited
at note 6, 211 (citing Anita L. Allen, Surrogacy, Slavery, and the Ownership of Life,
13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoLy 139, 147-48 (1990)). Under such arguments, the surro-
gate is viewed as not acting freely. Lieber, cited at note 6, at 211.
45. Lori Andrews, in her article on feminist responses to surrogacy, asserted
that many feminists believe that "women cannot give an informed consent until they
have had the experience *of giving birth." Andrews, cited at note 17, at 172.
46. Gostin, cited at note 12, at 14 (citing Rivera v. Marcus, 696 F.2d 1016 (2d
Cir. 1982)). Gostin's article cites to the Federal Court of Appeals decision of Rivera,
for the proposition that there are some rights which will not be allowed to be
waived until they can, in fact, be invoked. See Gostin, cited at note 12, at 14 (citing
Rivera, 696 F.2d at 1026). In Rivera, the federal court refused to find that a woman
had waived her due process right by signing a foster-care contract, because the right
that the woman apparently agreed to waive was not in existence at the time the
contract was signed. Rivera, 696 F.2d at 1026.




cannot be recognized as an advanced waiver.49
A woman's decision to raise a child to whom she gave birth,
although not absolute, is perhaps as fundamental as her right to
make health decisions which relate to her pregnancy."0 Oppo-
nents of the enforcement of surrogacy contracts argue that a
surrogate's feelings toward a fetus may change as she nurtures
the fetus over the nine month period." In support of their con-
tention that a surrogate should have the right to change her
mind, opponents cite to adoption statutes, that allow for a time
period in which a woman who gives up her child for adoption
can change her mind and keep the child.52 Furthermore, oppo-
nents argue that a woman cannot give her informed consent to
relinquish her parental rights until after she has experienced
childbirth."3
An alternative viewpoint, however, is that under the doctrine
of informed consent an individual is normally required to predict
in advance of actually experiencing something whether she wish-
es to go through with the particular experience.' Under the
reasoning of surrogacy opponents, individuals would also not be
able to consent to operations such as sterilization, abortions, sex
changes and heart surgery until they had experienced the par-
ticular procedure.5
Furthermore, the argument that a woman cannot consent to
giving up her child prior to birth conflicts with the advances of
the women's movement.56 For example, one feminist writer
stated that "[i]t would seem to be a step backward for women to
argue that they are incapable of making decisions. That, after
all, was the rationale for so many legal principles oppressing
49. Id.
50. In In re Baby M, the New Jersey Supreme Court contended that a
parent's right to the companionship of his or her child was not absolute. In re Baby
M, 537 A.2d at 1255 n.14. The right has been found not to be absolute when a
natural parent did not step forward and try to establish a relationship with a child.
Id. (citing Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 258-62 (1983)). Further, if there is a
substantial state interest then the right to parent a child can be restricted or even
terminated. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1255 n.14 (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455
U.S. 745 (1982)).
51. Gostin, cited at note 12, at 16.
52. Id. at 14.
53. Andrews, cited at note 17, at 172. In In re Baby M, the New Jersey Su-
preme Court acknowledged this argument when the court asserted "quite clearly any
decision prior to the baby's birth is, in the most important sense, uninformed." Id.
(citing In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1248).
54. Andrews, cited at note 17, at 172.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 173.
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women for so long." 7 Therefore, there is a strong presumption,
at least among feminists, that surrogacy contracts should not be
opposed merely based on the argument that women cannot give
their informed consent to relinquishing their parental rights.e
Although a woman may have a protected right to parent a
child, that right is not absolute. 9 If a woman gives her in-
formed consent to relinquish that right, the waiver of the paren-
tal right could be upheld. Clearly, arguments that surrogacy
contracts violate a woman's constitutional right of reproductive
freedom are accepted to a greater extent by the courts than
arguments that surrogacy contracts are not enforceable because
a woman cannot give her informed consent to relinquish her
parental right prior to the birth of the child."0
JUDICIAL RESPONSES TO SURROGACY CONTRACTS
Although various court battles over surrogacy agreements
have received widespread media attention, only one percent of
surrogate mothers change their minds and decide to keep the
child. 1 Nevertheless, this one percent have forced state courts
to respond to issues raised by surrogacy contracts. The state
court decisions, although scarce in number,2 have generally




59. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1255 n.14.
60. The New Jersey Supreme Court in In re Baby M, would not decide the
issue of a parent's right of companionship with a child. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at
1255. Instead, the court found the contract invalid on other grounds, namely that
the contract was violative of statutory law 'and public policies of the state. Id. at
1240. Further, the California Supreme Court in Johnson refused to recognize that
the surrogate had a protected parental right. See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 785-88. In
Johnson, the court's reasoning was that the surrogate was not genetically related to
the child and thus could not assert any parental right. Id.
61. Andrews, cited at note 17, at 171. The one percent of surrogate mothers
who change their minds can be put in perspective by comparing it to the 75% of
biological mothers who change their minds after giving up their child for adoption.
ld.
62. See Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 898 n.13. The California court ac-
knowledged that surrogacy was an area of the law where there were significantly
more law review articles written concerning the subject than judicial decisions. Id.
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The Best Interest of the Child Approach
The most famous case to address the issue of the validity of
surrogacy contracts was In re Baby M." In In re Baby M, a sur-
rogate mother contracted with a childless couple and agreed to
be artificially inseminated with the husband's sperm.' The sur-
rogate was to bear a child for the intended parents for
$10,000.' However, before the birth of the child, the surrogate
decided she could not give up the child and took legal action to
retain custody of the child.' The ensuing legal battle lasted
almost two years.
The New Jersey Supreme Court held that the surrogacy con-
tract was unenforceable because it was counter to existing:
(1) laws prohibiting the use of money in connection with adoptions; (2)
laws requiring proof of parental unfitness or abandonment before termi-
nation of parental rights is ordered or an adoption is granted; and (3)
laws that make surrender of custody and consent to adoption revocable
in private placement adoptions.'
Additionally, the court concluded that the contract was unen-
forceable because it conflicted with public policy."9 The court fur-
ther asserted that the contract was unenforceable because a
woman could not contract away her parental right.70 The court
63. 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
64. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1235.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1236.
67. Baby M was born on March 27, 1986 and by March 31 the surrogate had
informed the intended parents of her inability to give the child up. Id. at 1236-37.
The intended parents then filed court papers and obtained an order requiring that
the child be given over to the intended parents. Id. at 1237. The surrogate fled the
state with Baby M, however Baby M was forcibly returned to the intended parents
approximately four months later. Id. The legal battle then proceeded through the
court system of New Jersey, ending when the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled on
February 3, 1988. Id. at 1227.
68. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1240.
69. Id. at 1250. The court listed the following reasons to explain why the
contract was contrary to public policy:
[The surrogacy contract] guarantees the separation of a child from its mother;
it looks to adoption regardless of suitability; it totally ignores the child; it
takes the child from the mother regardless of her wishes, and her maternal
fitness; and it does all of this, it accomplishes all of its goals, through the use
of money.
Id. The court further contended that "[tlhe contract's basic premise, that the natural
parents can decide in advance of birth which one is to have custody of the child,
bears no relationship to the settled law that the child's best interest shall determine
custody." Id. at 1246. The court noted that harmful consequences of surrogacy con-
tracts "appear to us all too palpable." Id. at 1250.
70. Id. at 1247-48. The court noted that because a surrogacy contract required
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concluded that the surrogate's parental right could only be extin-
guished by a showing of parental unfitness.7'
After deciding that the contract was unenforceable, the court
turned to the practical issue of who should have custody of the
child.7" The court decided the parental rights of the parties as if
the case was a child custody dispute and invoked the best inter-
est of the child standard." The court ultimately held that the
intended parents should raise the child and that the surrogate
should have visitation rights."
More recently, the New York Family Court, in In re Paul,"
held that a surrogacy contract was void because it violated public
policy against the acceptance of compensation in exchange for the
adoption of a child.7" In In re Paul, the surrogacy contract pro-
vided for the payment of $10,000, plus expenses, if the surrogate
would agree to be artificially inseminated with the sperm of the
contracting male.77 The conflict in this case arose when the sur-
rogate petitioned the court to judicially consent to the adoption of
her son by the natural father and his wife.7"
The court concluded that because New York's adoption laws
prohibited payment in connection with an adoption, any payment
made in a surrogacy situation was also prohibited.79 The court
would not accept the surrender and termination of the
a woman to irrevocably commit to giving up her child before "she knows the
strength of her bond with her child" the contract could not be considered totally
voluntary. Id. at 1248. The court concluded that any decision made before the child
was born was an uninformed decision. Id.
71. Id. at 1256-57. The court again cited child custody principles to support
this conclusion. Id. at 1257. The court found controlling the principle that it was
"desirable for the child to have contact with both parents." Id. at 1263. Therefore,
because the surrogate was not found to be an unfit parent, the court ruled that the
surrogate should be awarded visitation rights. Id.
72. Id. at 1255.
73. In re Baby M, 538 A.2d at 1256. The best interest of child standard in-
volved evaluating the fitness of both parents and deciding which life would be more
suitable for the child. Id. at 1257.
74. Id. at 1261. The trial court examined and heard testimony from experts as
to the stability of family life in both the Stern and Whitehead households. Id. at
1258.
75. 550 N.Y.S.2d 815 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1990).
76. In re Paul, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 818.
77. Id. at 815-16.
78. Id. at 816. The court addressed two separate issues. Id. First, the court
found it necessary to address the issue of whether the surrogate's contract with the
natural father was legal under New York law. Id. Second, the court determined
whether the surrogate's surrender of her parental rights could only be accepted "if
she foreswears acceptance of the benefit of her bargain and thus assures this court
that such surrender is truly voluntary and is motivated by her concern for the best
interest of her child and not the promise of financial gain." Id.
79. Id. at 818.
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surrogate's parental rights unless the surrogate agreed to swear
under oath that she would not accept or receive the money prom-
ised to her."0 In reaching its decision, the court looked directly
to the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in In re Baby M."'
The New York court found that only by giving up the monetary
compensation could the surrogate be "motivated exclusively by
Paul's best interest."82 Therefore, the New York court, like the
New Jersey court, based its conclusion concerning surrogacy
contracts on a combination of statutory law and public policy
considerations. The overriding consideration in each of these
cases, however, was the best interest of the child.
Statutory Law Approach
Both the New Jersey Supreme Court and the New York
Family Court held, respectively in In re Baby M and In re Paul,
that surrogacy contracts concerning traditional surrogacy ar-
rangements were unenforceable primarily because the surrogacy
contracts were not in the best interest of the child and therefore
were violative of public policy." This approach, however, has not
been taken by all state courts which have been confronted with
the issue of the legality of surrogacy contracts. For example,
California courts have based their decisions solely on California
statutory law, thus neglecting any public policy considerations.
The California Supreme Court in Johnson v. Calvert' was the
first court to address the issue of whether a surrogate mother,
with no genetic connection to a child to whom she gave birth, had
a parental right with respect to that child." In this landmark
80. Id. at 819. Additionally, the natural father and his wife would have to
swear that they also would not pay compensation in exchange for the child. Id.
81. In re Paul, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 817. The court stated that it found "the
analysis and conclusion reached by the New Jersey Supreme Court compelling." Id.
82. Id. at 819.
83. In In re Baby M, the court stated that the contract was invalid first be-
cause it conflicted with existing adoption and parenting statutes which require that
the best interest of the child control adoption matters. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at
1240-41. Second, the court recognized that the contract was in conflict with state
public policies which required that the best interest of the child should be control-
ling in custody matters. Id. at 1240, 1246. Further, in In re Paul, the court had
refused to recognize the adoption of the surrogate's child until it was clear that the
surrogate had the best interest of the child in mind. In re Paul, 550 N.Y.S.2d at
819.
84. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (en banc), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 206 (1994).
85. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 778. This case involved a gestational surrogacy ar-
rangement where a couple, Mark and Crispina Calvert, entered into a contract with
a surrogate, Anna Johnson. Id. Under the contract, the surrogate was to be im-
pregnated with an embryo created by the sperm of Mark and the egg of Crispina.
Id. The resulting child was to be Mark and Crispina's and the surrogate was to
Vol. 33:903916
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case, the California Supreme Court held that the surrogate moth-
er had no parental rights to the child who was not genetically
related to her." The court reasoned that custody should be
awarded to the couple who supplied the fertilized egg and "in-
tended" to raise the child.87
The court, in reaching its decision, discussed whether a surro-
gacy agreement, which required a surrogate to relinquish her
parental rights, was barred on either a public policy or constitu-
tional basis.' The surrogate argued that the surrogacy contract
could not be upheld because it was violative of several state so-
cial polices.89 First, she relied on the public policy in the Califor-
nia Penal Code, which prohibited money payments with regard to
an adoption.9° The court disagreed with the surrogate's reliance
on the Penal Code and stated that "surrogacy differs in crucial
respects from adoption and so is not subject to the adoption stat-
utes."' The court distinguished a surrogacy contract from an
adoption arrangement by concluding that when a surrogate en-
tered into a contract, she was not in such a position as to be
vulnerable to offers of substantial sums of money in exchange for
her child. 2 In other words, the court found that the surrogate
was not in a position where she had a child to sell.93 She was
relinquish "all parental rights.".Id. The surrogate would be paid $10,000 for fulfilling
her obligations. Id. As the pregnancy progressed, the relationship between Mark,
Crispina and Anna deteriorated and Anna eventually threatened to keep the child if
the balance of her fee was not paid. Id. Mark and Crispina then initiated a lawsuit
in which they sought a court declaration of their parental rights. Id.
86. Id. at 777-78.
87. Id. at. 782. The court first addressed the question of who was the natural
mother of the child. Id. The surrogate's basis for claiming maternity rested on the
fact she had given birth to the child. Id. at 779. Alternatively, the married couple
contended that the genetic link of the married women to the child was the deter-
mining factor. Id. The court concluded that both women had presented "acceptable
proof of maternity" under the California Uniform Parentage Act and as such, the
court decided to defer to the parties' intentions in entering the contract. Id. at 782.
88. Id. at 783-87.
89. Id. at 783-84.
90. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 783-84. The surrogate cited California Penal Code,
section 273, which makes it a misdemeanor for money or anything of value to be
paid in an adoption situation. Id. at 784 n.ll. (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 273
(1993)). The surrogate further cited Penal Code section 181 which provides a punish-
ment of imprisonment of two to four years for anyone who "holds, or attempts to
hold, any person in involuntary servitude ...or attempts to sell, any person to an-
other, or receives money or anything of value, in consideration of placing any person
in the custody ...of another." Johnson, 851 P.2d at 784 n.ll (citing CAL. PENAL
CODE § 181 (1993)).
91. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 784.
92. Id. The court specifically found that the surrogate would not be "vulner-
able to financial inducements to part with her own expected offspring." Id.
93. Id.
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merely entering into a contract in which the money was compen-
sation for her services.'
The court also discussed the public policy argument that surro-
gacy contracts harmed women by exploiting and even dehumaniz-
ing them. 5 The court acknowledged that it would seem to make
sense that women of a lower economic class would more often
serve as surrogates.' However, the court was unpersuaded by
this argument because the court found no factual basis for con-
cluding that surrogacy contracts exploited poor women to any
greater extent than society in general exploited poor women.97
The court also was not persuaded by the constitutional argu-
ments raised by the surrogate mother." The court refused to
find that the surrogate had any constitutional right to the
child. 9 Specifically, the court was not persuaded by the
surrogate's reliance on case law recognizing the right of natural
parents to have custody of their children under the theories of
privacy and reproductive freedom.'00 The court reasoned that
such cases were applicable only to natural parents and because
the court had already determined that the surrogate was not the
natural parent of the child, she could not rely on those consti-
tutional rights conferred on natural parents. 0' Further, the
94. Id. The court asserted that, "[tihe payments to Anna under the contract
were meant to compensate her for her services in gestating the fetus and undergo-
ing labor, rather than for giving up 'parental' rights to the child." Id.
95. Id. The court, in addressing Anna's argument that surrogacy contracts are
harmful to women, concluded that:
Anna's objections center around the psychological harm she asserts may result
from the gestator's relinquishing the child to whom she has given birth ....
We are unpersuaded that gestational surrogacy arrangements are so
likely to cause the untoward results Anna cites as to demand their invalida-
tion on public policy grounds.
Id. at 784-85.
96. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 785.
97. Id. The court reasoned that, "there has been no proof that surrogacy con-
tracts exploit poor women to any greater degree than economic necessity in general
exploits them by inducing them to accept lower-paid or otherwise undesirable em-
ployment." Id.
98. Id. at 785-87. The court first dismissed the procedural due process and
equal protection arguments. Id. at 785.
99. Id. at 787.
100. Id. at 785-86.
101. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 786. The court discussed the surrogate's constitution-
al arguments that she had the right to parent a child and concluded that:
Anna's argument depends on a prior determination that she is indeed the
child's mother. Since Crispina is the child's mother under California law be-
cause she, not Anna, provided the ovum for the in vitro fertilization procedure,
intending to raise the child as her own, it follows that any constitutional
interests Anna possesses in this situation are something less that those of a
mother.
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court noted that if it was to conclude that the surrogate was enti-
tled to enjoy a liberty interest in the child, such a conclusion
would clearly infringe on the liberty interest of the genetic par-
ents. 2 Therefore, the court concluded that a surrogate in a ges-
tational surrogacy arrangement was not exercising her own pro-
creative choices, but simply agreeing to provide a service. 3
In reaching its decision, the California Supreme Court ad-
dressed both the public policy and constitutional arguments
against surrogacy contracts, but nevertheless, dismissed all such
arguments and upheld the validity of the contract."° The court
never questioned directly the validity of the contract.' Instead,
the court was concerned with determining who was the natural
mother of the resulting child.0 6 Most notably, however, the
court refused to rely on the policy argument that custody should
be decided by the best interest of the child standard."7
The court, instead, discussed and attempted to rely on statuto-
ry law."0 The court first tried to determine the issue of mater-
nity under the Uniform Parentage Act (the "Act"), which encom-
passes a section of the California Family Code. 9 The court ac-
Id.
102. Id. at 786.
103. Id. at 787.
104. Id. at 783, 785-86. The Johnson court asserted that, "in our view [the
gestational surrogacy agreement] is not on its face, inconsistent with public policy."
Id. at 783.
105. id. at 777-78. The court outlined the issues it would address at the be-
ginning of its opinion and the validity of the contract was not among these issues.
Id.
106. Johnson, 951 P.2d at 777-78.
107. Id. at 782 n.10. The court asserted that a decision based on the best in-
terest of the child:
[Rlaises the repugnant specter of governmental interference in matters impli-
cating our most fundamental notions of privacy, and confuses concepts of par-
entage and custody . . . the best interest standard poorly serves the child in
the present situation: it fosters instability during litigation and, if applied to
recognize the gestator as the natural mother, results in a split of custody
between the natural father and the gestater, an outcome not likely to benefit
the child.
Id.
108. Id. at 778-82.
109. Id. at 779 (citing CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 7600-7650 (West 1994)). The Cali-
fornia Uniform Parentage Act was enacted as a result of the United States Senate
proposing a bill entitled the Uniform Parentage Act as part of legislation introduced
in 1975. See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 778. The proposed legislation in the U.S. Senate
came about as a result of United State Supreme Court decisions which had elimi-
nated the legal distinction between legitimate and illegitimate children. Id. (citing
Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) and Glona v. American Guarantee Co., 391
U.S. 73 (1968)). The main portions of this Senate Bill became part of the California
Family Code, which was entitled the Uniform Parentage Act. See Johnson, 851 P.2d
at 778 (citing CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 7600-7650).
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knowledged that it had been "invited to disregard the Act and
decide this case according to [the surrogate's] criteria, including
constitutional percepts and our sense of the demands of public
policy.""0 Nevertheless, the court refused to disregard the
Act."' The Act, however, did not provide a clear cut answer for
the court because under the Act maternity could be established
by either giving birth to a child or by being genetically related to
a child."' Therefore, the court could not specifically decide ma-
ternity based on the Act and so the court turned to the intentions
of the parties."3
At first blush, it may seem as if Johnson and In re Baby M are
directly at odds. However, Johnson involved a gestational surro-
gacy arrangement, while In re Baby M involved a traditional
surrogacy. The California court was, thus, addressing the issue of
who was a child's natural mother under California law rather
than whether a natural mother could waive her parental right
prior to the birth of a child."' In a more recent California case,
Moschetta v. Moschetta,"' a traditional surrogacy contract in
California was found to be unenforceable."
6
In Moschetta, a California court of appeals held that a tradi-
tional surrogacy contract was unenforceable because the contract
was incompatible with the parentage and adoption statutes of the
state." 7 The court asserted that the surrogate had not consent-
ed to an adoption by the intended mother when she signed the
surrogacy contract. 8 The dispute in Moschetta arose when the
surrogate discovered that the married couple for whom she was
110. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 779.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 780 (citing CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 7600-7650).
113. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782.
114. The issue in Johnson was 'when pursuant to a surrogacy agreement, a
zygote formed of the gametes of a husband and wife was implanted in the uterus of
another woman, who carried the resulting fetus to term and gives birth to a child
not genetically related to her, who is the child's 'natural mother.' " Johnson, 851
P.2d at 777-78. However, in In re Baby M, the issue to be resolved was "the validi-
ty of a contract that purports to provide a new way of bringing children into a
family." In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1234.
115. 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
116. Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 894-95.
117. Id. Moschetta involved a couple, Robert and Cynthia Moschetta, who con-
tracted with a surrogate, Elvira Jordan, to bear their child. Id. at 895. Elvira Jor-
dan was artificially inseminated with Robert Moschetta's semen. Id. Jordan was to
be paid $10,000 in " 'recognition' of Robert's obligations to support Ithel child and
his right to provide [Jordan] with living expenses." Id.
118. Id. at 900. The court concluded that the surrogacy contract was not an
adoption agreement and therefore, the surrogate had not given her consent to give
the child up to the intended parents. Id.
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bearing a child was having marital difficulties." 9 The surrogate
learned that the husband had asked his wife for a divorce the
day before the child was born. 2 ' The surrogate reconsidered the
arrangement, but still relinquished the child to the married cou-
ple several days after the birth.121 However, within seven
months the married couple's relationship was severed and the
husband left the residence with the child.122 The husband, wife
and the surrogate all filed petitions to establish custody of the
child.123
The court's decision relied on both the Johnson decision and
the parenting and adoption statutes of California."24 The court
examined the reasoning of the Johnson case, which had relied on
the Uniform Parentage Act,125 to determine maternity.1" In
Moschetta, however, the terms of the Uniform Parentage Act
were controlling because the surrogate mother was both the ge-
netic and birth mother.1 27 Therefore, the court only had to de-
cide whether the surrogacy agreement could be considered a
waiver of the surrogate's parental rights.'28 Ultimately, the
court refused to view the surrogacy agreement as an adoption
agreement entered into prior to the child's birth because the
consent to adopt was not given in conformity with statutory
law.1
29
119. Id. at 895.
120. Id.
121. Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 895. The child was born on May 28, 1990,
but the surrogate did not allow the married couple to take the child home until
May 31. Id.
122. Id. at 895.
123. Id. The actions were consolidated but three separate issues were to be
decided so the case was ordered trifurcated for trial. Id. The three phases of the tri-
al were as follows: (1) the parental rights of Cynthia Moschetta and Elvira Jordan
were to be determined; (2) custody and visitation rights were to be determined; and
(3) the marital dissolution case was to be decided separately from the custody dis-
pute. Id.
124. Id. at 898-901.
125. See note 109 for discussion of the California Uniform Parentage Act.
126. Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 898-99 (citing Johnson, 851 P.2d at 780). In
Johnson, the court found that the Act, which defined maternity both in terms of
genetics and birth, did not resolve the issue of maternity. Johnson, 852 P.2d at 782.
The Johnson court, faced with statutory authority that supported both the
surrogate's and the childless women's claim of maternity, decided that the initial
intentions of the parities should control. Id.
127. Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 900.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 900-01. The court asserted that the adoption statute required the
birth parents to consent to an adoption before a social worker. Id. at 900. In
Moschetta, the contract obviously had not been consented to before a social worker.
Id. Therefore, the California court essentially refused to recognize the contract as an
advanced waiver of the surrogate's parental rights. Id.
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The California court in Moschetta did not base its holding on
public policy reasons.30 Instead, the court looked to statutory
authority to resolve the issues raised by the surrogacy contract,
similarly to what the court had done in Johnson.3' Not surpris-
ingly, both the Johnson and Moschetta courts acknowledged the
need for legislative guidance to address surrogacy issues."'
LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO SURROGACY ISSUES
The courts both want and need legislative guidance on surro-
gacy issues.'33 However, because of the sensitive nature and
fundamental rights involved with surrogacy contracts, even the
legislatures are dragging their feet."" The issues that must be
resolved include: who is the natural mother of a child born of a
gestational surrogacy arrangement; can surrogacy contracts re-
quire a surrogate to relinquish her established reproductive free-
doms; and can compensation be legally paid to a surrogate moth-
er. The answers, although not easily derived, depend on societal
views of parental and reproductive rights. Therefore, it seems
logical that the legislature, which has traditionally been the
forum for resolving public policy issues, should enact legislation
which would seek to avoid the conflicts that arise out of surroga-
cy contracts.
Current Legislation
State statutes concerning surrogacy contracts can be divided
into four categories. First, there are the state statutes which
simply make all surrogacy contracts void and unenforceable. 135
130. Id. at 894. The court specifically stated, "we decline to enforce the agree-
ment, not for public policy reasons sometimes advanced by those who oppose surro-
gacy." Id. at 894.
131. Id. at 900.
132. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 787; Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 903.
133. In Johnson, the court indicated that it was not its place to decide issues
concerning reproductive technologies. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 787. The California court
stated 'ilt is not the role of the judiciary to inhibit the use of reproductive tech-
nology when the Legislature has not seen fit to do so." Id. In Moschetta, the court
specifically asserted that "the need for legislative guidance regarding the difficult
problems arising from surrogacy arrangements is apparent." Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 903. See also, In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1264.
134. As of 1987, over half the states have proposed legislation concerning sur-
rogacy contract, but legislatures have had only limited success in passing such pro-
posals. Charo, cited at note 10, at 96.
135. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-218 (1991); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-8-2-1
(Burns 1994); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-05 (1991); see also D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-401
(Supp. 1994). Many state statutes specifically base the unenforceability of the con-
tract on public policy considerations. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 121-124 (McKinney
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However, these statutes are flawed because they disregard the
fundamental constitutional rights of the parties involved in a
surrogacy arrangement.13 Such rights include "the rights to
privacy in making an intimate personal decision on reproduction;
the right to autonomy in decisions affecting the health and wel-
fare of the mother and the offspring; and the right to association
with future offspring. ""'7
Further, the legislatures are presuming that because surrogacy
contracts are unenforceable couples will be less likely to enter
into such arrangements. The reality is that as long as there are
infertile couples, surrogacy situations are going to exist. 13 The
legislatures, by seeking to ban surrogacy contracts, are not deal-
ing with the underlying issues raised by surrogacy arrangements.
Instead, the legislatures are again leaving parties to surrogacy
arrangements to turn to the courts when their agreements fall
apart.
The second category of surrogacy statutes are those that have
not only banned surrogacy arrangements but have criminalized
such arrangements. Only Michigan, thus far, has taken this
extreme position and criminalized surrogacy contracts.'39 The
Michigan approach to surrogacy arrangements will certainly act
as a bar to anyone in Michigan entering into a surrogacy ar-
rangement because of the criminal penalties that parties will be
subject to for entering such a contract."4 For the same reasons
discussed in reference to statutes that ban surrogacy contracts,
Michigan's statute is flawed in that it violates the contracting
parties' constitutional rights. 4' Additionally, criminalizing sur-
rogacy arrangements will not stop couples from crossing state
boarders and entering into contracts in states that do not ban
such arrangements.
Supp. 1994); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590 (Baldwin 1991); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
9:2713 (West 1991); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,200 (1989); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-
204(1) (1995); WASH REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.240 (West Supp. 1991).
136. Gostin, cited at note 12, at 4.
137. Id.
138. Maria E. Schwartz, Note, How Technology has Affected the Legal System:
Great Expectations: the Surrogacy Debate Continues, 34 How. L.J. 169, 171 (1991).
Even with statutes in place that seek to ban surrogacy contracts, desperate couples
will "simply take their chances" and continue to contract with surrogates. Id.
139. See MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 25.248(151)-(155) (1991).
140. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 25.248(159). Fines and imprisonment under the Michi-
gan statute range from $10,000 and one year imprisonment for entering a surrogacy
contract to $50,000 and five years imprisonment for arranging or assisting in mak-
ing a surrogacy contract. Id.
141. See notes 131-33 and accompanying text for discussion of why statutes




Further, one must question if criminal penalties are really the
answer. It is the minority of surrogates who change their
minds." Therefore, should we bar all women from being able
to make a childless couple's dreams comes true?
Third, there is the West Virginia statute which appears to
recognize as legal the acceptance of surrogacy fees related to a
surrogacy contract."' The West Virginia statute may be unique
but it hardly presents a solution to the problems that arise from
surrogacy arrangements. The West Virginia statute is part of the
state's adoption law'" and presents only an exception to the
general rule that money payments in adoptions are prohibited.
Finally, there are a minority of state statutes which make
surrogacy contracts legal, but not necessarily enforceable."
This fourth category legalizes surrogacy contracts only when they
have been judicially approved." New Hampshire's statute falls
into this last category and presents the most workable legislation
for dealing with the problems that arise from surrogacy con-
tracts.
The New Hampshire Surrogacy Statute
The New Hampshire statute, enacted in 1990, provides for a
regulatory process whereby the surrogacy arrangement is only
legal if it has been judicially preauthorized. 47 Before obtaining
the court's approval, all the parties must complete both medical
and non-medical evaluations, and attend counselling sessions.'48
142. See note 61 for discussion of the percentage of surrogates who change
their minds after signing a surrogacy contract.
143. See W.V. CODE ANN. § 48-4-16-(e)(3) (Michie Supp. 1993). The West Virgin-
ia statute provides for an exception to the rule that compensation cannot be given
in an adoption situation by providing that with respect to a surrogate her "fees and
expenses" can be paid without violating the law. W.V. CODE ANN. § 48-4-16-(e)(3).
144. Id.
145. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.212(1)(i) (West Supp. 1990); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 168-B (Equity Supp. 1991); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-100 (Michie Supp. 1992).
146. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.212(1)(i); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B; VA.
CODE ANN. § 20-100.
147. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:16(b). A court hearing occurs in order for
the contract to be validated. Id. § 168-B:23.
148. Id. § 168-B:16(a). The medical evaluation involves the surrogate and the
intended parents, if it is a gestational surrogacy. Id. § 168-B:19(I). If it is a tradi-
tional surrogacy, then only the surrogate and the natural father must undergo a
medical evaluation. Id. Each party undergoes a nonmedical evaluation by a psychia-
trist, psychologist, pastoral counselor or social worker, who is licensed in New
Hampshire. Id. § 168-B:18(l). The parties must waive any confidentiality rights in
relation to these nonmedical evaluations. Id. The nonmedical evaluation determines
the fitness of the intended parents and the ability of the parties to assume the risks
and problems of the contract. Id. §§ 168-B:18(I)-(11). Finally, the nonmedical evalua-
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Additionally, the surrogacy contract must conform to certain
mandatory requirements which seek to spell out the rights of all
parties to the contract.' Finally, the court must determine
whether the surrogacy arrangement is in the best interest of the
child 150
If the surrogacy contract is judicially approved, the contract
will act as a court order which will automatically terminate both
the surrogate's and her husband's parental rights after birth. 5 '
However, the surrogate can at any time until seventy-two hours
after the birth exercise her rights to keep the child.15' If the
surrogate chooses to exercise her right, then the contract will act
as a court order which will automatically terminate the parental
rights of the intended parents. 5'
The Adequacy of the New Hampshire Statute
The New Hampshire statute does not differentiate between a
traditional and gestational surrogacy." Even if the intended
parents are both genetically related to the child, the surrogate
can exercise her right and retain custody of the child.'55 The
New Hampshire statute, therefore, places more significance on
gestation and birth rather than on genetics.' Of course, the
tion also consists of a home study of each party to determine their ability to provide
the basic necessities to the child. Id. § 168-B:18(II).
149. Id. § 168-B:25. The mandatory terms include a provision that the surro-
gate will surrender the child or accept the obligation to raise the child if she gives
notice any time prior to 72 hours after the birth. Id. §§ 168-B:25(D), (IV). Also, if the
surrogate is married, her husband must consent to surrendering the child or alterna-
tively, taking responsibility for the child. Id. § 168-B:25(11). The contract must in-
clude a provision stating that the intended parents will provide for the child. Id. §
168-B:25(III). Further, if the surrogate is to receive a fee that must be outlined in
the contract. Id. § 168-B:25(V). However, the fee must be limited to medical expens-
es incurred with the pregnancy, actual loss of wages during the pregnancy, life and
health insurance payments, reasonable attorney fees and counseling fees. Id.
150. Id. § 168-B:23(III)(d).
151. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:23(IV).
152. Id. § 168-B:25(IV). To exercise this right, the surrogate must sign a writ-
ing expressing her intentions and must deliver the writing to the intended parents
and the attending physician or hospital. Id.
153. Id. § 168-B:23(IV). The intended parents will, however, still have to pro-
vide financial support for the child. Id.
154. The New Hampshire statute's definition of a "surrogacy arrangement" pro-
vides that, "any arrangement by which a woman agrees to be impregnated using
either the intended father's sperm, the intended mother's egg, or their preembryo
with the intend that the intended parents are to become the parents of the resulting
child after the child's birth." Id. § 168-B:l(XII). This definition thus includes both
gestational and traditional surrogacy arrangements.
155. Id. § 168-B:23(d).
156. This is in contrast with Johnson, which held that the intended mother in
a gestational surrogacy should be considered the natural mother, because without
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parties know the risks and have undergone counselling to deal
with the situation that might arise if the surrogate decides to
keep the child. Nevertheless, the New Hampshire statute is
flawed to the extent that it fails to distinguish between tradition-
al and gestational surrogacy.
The California Supreme Court in Johnson presented a compel-
ling argument that genetics should determine a child's parents in
a gestational surrogacy situation."7 The California Supreme
Court explained that it was the intended parents who desired to
have a child and without their efforts to create a child, the surro-
gate would not have given birth."8 The court found that it was
the intention of the parties to bring the intended parent's child
into the world, and not for intended parents to donate a zygote to
the surrogate."9 Therefore, it appears that a surrogacy statute
must differentiate between traditional and gestational surroga-
cies in order to provide a fair solution for those couples who are
both genetically related to the child.
Additionally, the New Hampshire statute provides no recourse
for parties who do not obtain judicial approval. Under New
Hampshire law, a surrogacy contract that has not been approved
will not be recognized.' This requires parties who enter a sur-
rogacy contract without court approval, to turn to the courts if
the surrogate changes her mind. The New Hampshire courts will
then have to find the contract unenforceable, but will still be
faced with a custody dispute over the child.'6 '
the actions of the intended parties the child would not have been brought into this
world. See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782.
157. See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782-84.
158. Id. at 782.
159. Id. The court further contended that although the surrogate preformed a
necessary gestational function, "it is safe to say that [the surrogate] would not have
been given the opportunity to gestate or deliver the child had she, prior to implan-
tation of the zygote, manifested her own intent to be the child's mother." Id.
160. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-1:16.
161. The Virginia statute, which in many respects is similar to the New Hamp-
shire statute, does provide for non-court approved surrogacy arrangements. See VA.
CODE ANN. § 20-162(A). In Virginia, the parties must conform their contract to the




A PROPOSAL FOR AN "IDEAL" SURROGACY STATUTE
The Starting Point
Despite its deficiency, the New Hampshire statute is a good
starting point for surrogacy legislation. New Hampshire's re-
quirement of prior judicial approval of a surrogacy contract 62
may help to avoid later conflicts. The parties will know from the
outset what effect the contract will have and how each party
stands in relation to the other.
The New Hampshire statute requires the parties to be fully
informed and capable of both mentally and physically facing the
risks of entering such a contract. 6 ' This requirement reduces
potential conflicts which might arise after the surrogate is im-
pregnated. Of course, even extensive counselling may not neces-
sarily avoid a situation where the surrogate develops a bond with
the child and refuses to relinquish custody. It does, however, at
the very least allow the parties to recognize from the outset that
the surrogate could potentially change her mind and exercise her
right to keep the child. Therefore, mandatary counselling should
be a part of every surrogacy statute.
Further, a requirement of nonmedical evaluations, which will
determine if the surrogate and the intended parents can provide
both financially and emotionally for the child's needs, should be a
part of any ideal surrogacy statute. Such a requirement will help
avoid the potential exploitation of women" and diminish any
potential harm to the child.'6 5
Clearly, any fees paid to a surrogate should be limited, as they
are in the New Hampshire statute." By limiting the fees to
necessary medical expenses, counselling fees and attorney fees,
the principle argument against surrogacy is dispelled. Surrogacy
arrangements, which involve compensation to the surrogate,
create problems by raising issues of baby selling and exploitation
of the women.
162. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:16.
163. Id.
164. As stated earlier, a common argument that arises against surrogacy ar-
rangements is that surrogacy arrangements have the potential of exploiting women,
since for the most part surrogates are women of the lower economic classes. See
note 44 for discussion of the argument against surrogacy based on the theory that
surrogacy arrangements exploit women.
165. Opponents of surrogacy argue that the child born of a surrogacy arrange-
ment may be potentially harmed, although the research in this area is limited. See
notes 19-22 and accompanying text for further discussion of this argument.




Any ideal surrogacy statute should also distinguish between a
traditional and a gestational surrogacy. Although a surrogate
may develop a bond with a fetus that she is carrying, the genet-
ics of the child will not be changed by the surrogate's feelings
towards the child. A child who is genetically related to the two
intended parents should be placed with those parents, regardless
of whether the surrogate changes her mind. The Supreme Court's
refusal to review the Johnson decision' may have ended the
legal battle of the parties involved in the Johnson suit, but the
Court's decision perpetuates the nationwide debate as to gesta-
tional surrogacy.
An ideal surrogacy statute should also attempt to address
situations where the parties have failed to obtain prior court
approval. Desperate couples will continue to enter surrogacy
arrangements and as such, the legislatures cannot simply as-
sume every party will seek court approval. Requiring the surro-
gacy contract to conform to the certain statutory requirements,
even if entered into without court approval, will allow for an
equitable remedy for those parties that fail to obtain prior court
approval.
Finally, allowing the surrogate to change her mind up until the
72 hours after the birth of the child6 ' is not entirely practical.
The intended parents in a traditional surrogacy will be held in
limbo until the birth of the child. A better solution would be to
allow the surrogate anywhere from three or five months after she
is impregnated to decide if she wants to keep the child. There-
fore, on the birth of the child the parties will know what their
relationship to the child will be.
CONCLUSION
Legislation can provide some of the answers to surrogacy is-
sues but, fundamentally, parties entering into such arrangements
must understand and anticipate what kinds of problems may
arise. Surrogacy can bring joy to both a childless couple and a
surrogate, who enables the couple to have the child of their
dreams. However, surrogacy arrangements cannot be entered
into haphazardly and without serious considerations of all the
167. Johnson v. Calvert, 951 P.2d 776 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 206 (1993).
168. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:25(IV).
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potential problems that might arise. The ideal solution to avoid-
ing potential problems with surrogacy arrangements would be to
have uniform state statutes that require the parties to obtain
judicial approval of surrogacy contracts. Under such statutes, the
parties should be required to satisfy certain obligations before
the surrogacy is even begun. By requiring the parties to undergo
certain procedures before the surrogacy begins, there is a greater
chance that the end result of the surrogacy will be a happy new
family rather than an endless legal battle.
Susan A. Ferguson

